For a married couple to be divorced under Conservative or Orthodox Jewish law, the husband must prepare and present to his wife a bill of divorce or get 1 under the supervision of a rabbi. 2 The wife may not procure a divorce on her own.' If the husband leaves his wife without presenting a get to her, neither party may remarry under Jewish law." The wife must bear additional disabilities:' Her involvement in Jewish religious life becomes circumscribed. 6 Moreover, any children she bears from a subsequent sexual union are excluded by Jewish law from participation in the Jewish community. 7 Her husband does not suffer such severe consequences. 8 With the availability of civil divorce, many husbands married under Jewish law have sought and obtained civil divorces without giving their wives a get. 9 For the most part, they have been motivated by spite or by the desire to obtain a favorable alimony settlement. 10 Their wives have been unable to remarry under Jewish law or have been forced to bargain away a part of their rightful alimony to obtain a get.
In response to this problem, the New York Legislature enacted Domestic Relations Law section 253,11 commonly referred to as the get statute. The law requires that a party filing for divorce remove all conscientious or religious barriers within his or her power to the remarriage of the other spouse." 2 The statute raises anew the question of how far government is permitted under the establishment clause 13 to facilitate religious practices central to the identity and continued existence of a religious community. While no court has yet ruled on the question," 5 several commentators have expressed grave reservations about the constitutionality of the get statute. 1 6 They argue that the statute violates the establishment clause by casting government into questions properly within the purview of religion, giving religious functionaries control over civil affairs, and using civil courts to advance religion. In contrast, one commentator suggests that such a statute's accommodation of a Jewish woman's right to remarry within Judaism might be sufficient to justify it as a permissible accommodation of religion under the establishment clause. 1 Divergent analyses of the get statute's constitutionality under the establishment clause are not surprising, given the absence of a generally accepted approach that unifies free exercise and establishment jurisprudence. In their present states, neither establishment nor free exercise doctrine alone provides a basis to decide the constitutionality of the get statute, which raises both establishment and free exercise concerns. The Supreme Court has recognized a zone of accommodations of religion that are permitted by the establishment clause, though not required by the free exercise clause, 8 but it has failed to articulate the relationship between the two clauses and thus to demarcate clearly this zone. Oct. 27, 1983 , at 1, col. 3 (get statute violates establishment clause because it lacks secular purpose, impermissibly advances religion, and entangles government in religious affairs).
17. Bleich, supra note 9, at 277-86. Professor Bleich discusses a precursor of § 253, amendment A. 7980, enacted during the 1981-1982 legislative session but subsequently withdrawn from the governor's desk by its sponsor. Id. at 285. According to Professor Bleich, this amendment sought to codify divorce courts' traditional equity power to withhold divorces in situations in which granting a divorce would lead to an inequitable result, such as a party's inability to remarry within his or her religion. This Note proposes an approach to determining the permissibility of governmental accommodations of religion based on the norms embodied in both religion clauses. It defines an accommodation of religion as legislation that functions to remove governmentally imposed burdens on religious exercise. The Note next argues that establishment challenges to accommodations of religion should be evaluated under a different standard from that applied to legislation that does not meet the definition of accommodation. It then formulates a standard for the permissibility of a government accommodation of religion under the establishment clause that incorporates the legislation's status as an accommodation. Finally, the Note ap- plies this standard to the get statute and concludes that it is a permissible accommodation of religion.
II. GOVERNMENT ACCOMMODATIONS OF RELIGION

A. The Tension Between the Free Exercise Guarantee and the Nonestablishment Mandate
The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... )20 Together, the religion clauses create a division between a private sphere, within which the free exercise clause protects individual exercise of religion, and a public governmental sphere, from which the establishment clause excludes religion. 21 The religion clauses envision a secular government under which a plurality of religious ways of life are free to flourish. 22 In Zorach v. Clauson, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, emphasized: "We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and appeal of its dogma." 23 Despite the unified purpose underlying the religion clauses, either clause, "if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other." '24 Through excessive solicitude for religious exercise, government may run afoul of the establishment clause. 25 Conversely, too stringent application of the nonestablishment mandate may violate the free exercise guarantee. 26 The expansion of the welfare state since World War II and the consequent blurring of the line between the governmental and private spheres have caused this conceptual tension, which is inherent in the religion clauses, to emerge acutely. 27 20. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The free exercise and establishment clauses apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940 Professor Kurland has argued that the tension between the two clauses must be resolved in favor of strict neutrality: Government may not use any religious classifications either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden on religion. 28 An implication of his view is that the free exercise clause does not justify granting religious exemptions from otherwise valid legislation. 2 Other commentators have argued that Professor Kurland ignores the preferred position that the Constitution confers on religious exercise through the free exercise clause. 3 0 The Supreme Court has never espoused a strictly neutral interpretation of the clauses; rather, it has regularly construed the free exercise clause to exempt religious exercise from burdensome legislation even though such exemptions in some sense benefit religion. 31 The approach reflected in exemption doctrine can be characterized as benign neutrality. In situations where government must choose between infringing upon or facilitating religious exercise, the free exercise clause requires that, absent an overriding governmental interest, government choose the latter course. 3 2 Requiring parochial school instructors to meet teacher certification requirements increases the costs of religious education. Distinguishing which of these infringements of religious freedom must give way to the constitutional guarantee of free exercise, from those which need not, has been a central challenge of the Court's free exercise jurisprudence.
In Braunfeld v. Brown, 3 3 the Court resolved this difficult task by distinguishing direct from indirect burdens on religious exercise. 4 Although the Court has not relied on the distinction in subsequent free exercise cases, 3 5 it provides an analytic framework to separate occasions when government may be required to accommodate an adherent's religious exercise from those when government is not required but may be permitted to accommodate religious exercise. In Sherbert, the Court characterized the Braunfeld holding as a refusal to extend mandated free exercise protection to the indirect burden on religious exercise caused by a Sunday Closing Law, on the ground that the state had established a strong interest in a uniform day of rest. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408. This Note, in contrast, argues that Sherbert and its progeny expanded the meaning of direct burdens on religious exercise. See infra text accompanying notes 41-43. While the indirect/direct distinction may appear merely semantic, it has significant ramifications for free exercise analysis. Under the Court's construction, the distinction between indirect and direct burdens carries no analytic import; the test applied to either type of burden is whether a compelling state interest exists that outweighs the burdened free exercise interest. If not, the religious interest must be accommodated. See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
Although the Court did not rely on the direct/indirect distinction, last term, in Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986), it held that certain free exercise claims were not cognizable under the free exercise clause. The plaintiff in Bowen argued that the government's use of a Social Security number for his daughter infringed his free exercise of religion, because he believed that such use would impair his daughter's spirit. Id. at 2152. The Court held that his claim did not fall within the protection of the free exercise clause. Id. Under this Note's analysis, in contrast, the government's use of the number indirectly burdens the plaintiff's religious beliefs; consequently, the government is not required, but may be permitted, to accommodate the belief. 36. The usefulness of the distinction was pointed out to me by Professor Perry Dane. It is implicit A law imposes a direct burden on an adherent's religious exercise if, as applied to the adherent, its operation turns on the adherent's disavowal of a religious belief or abandonment of a religious practice. Thus, legislation imposes a direct burden when it requires a religious adherent to engage in actions forbidden by his or her faith," 7 or prohibits actions required by his or her faith. 8 For example, application of a narcotics law to native Americans who subscribe to Peyotism constitutes a direct burden on their religious exercise. 3 9 The law's prohibition of the use of peyote conflicts with the religious dictates prescribing its use. 0 In addition, legislation that conditions the receipt of generally available benefits upon the disavowal of religious beliefs or abandonment of religious practices directly burdens religious exercise. For example, legislation that conditions the availability of unemployment benefits on an applicant's willingness to work on Saturdays imposes a direct burden on the religious exercise of Sabbatarians. 41 Like the application of the narcotics law to adherents of Peyotism, the application of the unemployment benefit requirements to Sabbatarians turns on their renouncing their religious faith . 4 Legislation thus imposes a direct burden on religious exercise through its formal interaction with the dictates of religion. When legislation directly burdens an adherent's religious exercise, the free exercise clause requires government to exempt the adherent from the legislation, unless a compelling governmental interest overrides the adherent's free exercise interest. 48 Legislation imposes an indirect burden on religious exercise when it contributes to the economic or social costs of religious adherence. The Sunday Closing Law at issue in Braunfeld exemplifies such legislation. Braunfeld and the other appellants, Orthodox Jewish merchants, sought an exemption from a Sunday Closing Law." They argued that the law in the characterization of an exemption claim as a claim based on a conflict between the demands of religious faith and civil legal requirements. burdened the free exercise of their religion, which required them to refrain from work on Saturdays. 4 5 The Sunday Closing Law put them at a severe economic disadvantage in relation to merchants who could conduct business six days a week, in effect compelling them to choose between adherence to their faith and economic survival. 46 The law did not impose a requirement that formally contradicted the dictates of Judaism; rather, it was a factor that contributed to the cost of the appellants' religious adherence. 47 But for the competitive nature of the retail business, the legislation would not have had any consequences for their religious exercise. Because the burden was caused by the interaction of the statute and the prevailing economic conditions, it could be described as incidental to the legislation. Such a characterization, however, should not detract from appreciation of the severity of the cost involved: Braunfeld alleged that the Sunday Closing Law would force him to go out of business. 4 The Supreme Court held that the free exercise clause did not require Pennsylvania to exempt the Braunfeld appellants from the Sunday Closing Law. 49 The Court, however, did not appeal to establishment clause limitations on the free exercise guarantee that rendered such an exemption invalid; 50 rather, it strongly suggested that Pennsylvania would have been permitted to incorporate an exemption for Sabbatarians into the statute, had it so chosen. 51 Noting that a number of states provide such exemptions, it suggested that an exemption might be a "wiser solution to the problem.1 52 The Court also identified countervailing factors, such as enforcement and entanglement problems, that might prompt a legislature to withhold an exemption. 5 3 The Court thus viewed the propriety of an exemption as a question best left to the discretion of the legislature.
The Sunday Closing Law at issue in Braunfeld resulted in an economic cost to the plaintiffs' religious exercise. Zoning ordinances 4 and the taxation of religious institutions 5 5 may also impose financial burdens on religious exercise. Indirect burdens on religious exercise are not, however, Finally, government's actions may impose an indirect burden on an adherent's beliefs. For example, commercial development of governmentowned land containing Native American sacred religious sites places an indirect burden on the religious beliefs of adherents of religions that hold these sites sacred.
5 7 Similarly, the government's use of social security numbers may burden a Native American's belief that such use impairs his or her spirit."
Braunfeld's delimitation of mandated government accommodations to legislation directly burdening religious exercise did not derive strictly from either the nonestablishment mandate or from the free exercise guarantee. 5 9 Rather, the distinction between direct and indirect burdens corresponds broadly to practical limitations 0 on courts' capacity to manage full en- ) (commercial development of Hopi and Navajo sacred sites, which is "inconsistent with the plaintiffs' beliefs, and will cause the plaintiffs spiritual disquiet," nevertheless not enjoined by free exercise clause), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983) . But see Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 585-86 (9th Cir. 1985) (free exercise protection encompasses indirect burdens on site-specific religions created by development of land). Such development does not usually involve governmental denial of access to sacred sites for participation in rituals required by the religion. See, e.g., Wilson, 708 F.2d at 740. Development that imposed such an exclusion would directly burden the religious exercise of those adherents who held those sites sacred.
To characterize the development of federal lands containing sacred sites as imposing an indirect burden is not to belittle the development's devastating potential. It may result in the destruction of site-specific religions. See Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of Public Lands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447, 1447 (1985). The history of governmental appropriation of land inhabited by Native Americans may present a special case for full judicial enforcement of the free exercise guarantee. Even if it did not, this Note argues that the norm embodied in the free exercise clause compels legislatures to accommodate site-specific religions, despite the inability of courts to require such actions. See infra text accompanying notes 60-64.
58. See Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2151-53 (1986). Mr. Roy, the plaintiff, had asserted two separate free exercise claims: He argued that the government could not condition Social Security benefits upon the acquisition of a Social Security number for his daughter, because such acquisition violated his religious beliefs, and that the government, having assigned a Social Security number to his daughter, could not use it for internal purposes, because he believed this use would rob her spirit. Id. at 2151. With regard to the first claim, the plurality adopted a variation of the traditional test, evaluating the governmental interest in requiring that applicants acquire Social Security numbers. See id. at 2156-58 (plurality opinion). The Court did not find the second claim cognizable under the free exercise clause. "The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the [glovernment to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens." Id. at 2152.
59 The free exercise clause's prohibition against governmental interference justifies voluntary legislative attempts to facilitate religious exercise by removing indirect governmentally imposed burdens. 6 3 When government removes such burdens it is accommodating, rather than promoting, religion: When a statutory scheme contributes to the economic, social, or personal costs of religious exercise or belief, an accommodation alleviates such effects. 64 Governmental accommodations of religion include statutory exemptions, such as Sunday Closing Law exemptions 6 5 and taxation exemptions, 6 6 as religious exercise, for example taxation, id., and would be faced with the difficult task of evaluating in each case a series of factors whose assessment is best left to legislatures. It is an unfortunate development of free exercise doctrine that courts already engage in a balancing exercise when direct burdens on religious exercise are at issue. [Clonstitutional norms which are underenforced by the federal judiciary should be understood to be legally valid to their full conceptual limits, and federal judicial decisions which stop short of these limits should be understood as delineating only the boundaries of the federal courts' role in enforcing the norm: By 'legally valid,' I mean that the unenforced margins of underenforced norms should have the full status of positive law which we generally accord to the norms of our Constitution, save only that the federal judiciary will not enforce these margins. That legislation accommodates religion, however, is not sufficient to establish its permissibility under the establishment clause." 9 While the nonestablishment mandate does not necessarily require invalidation of governmental accommodations of religion as such, it places constraints on the means by which a particular attempt to remove governmentally imposed burdens on religion may be carried out. 0
A. Permissibility of Government's Attempts to Accommodate
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 7 1 the Supreme Court construed the nonestablishment mandate to require that a law (1) have a secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not lead to excessive governmental entanglement with religion. The Court has relied on Lemon's third prong, the prohibition against excessive governmental entanglement with religion, to invalidate a Massachusetts statute that authorized a church to block operating licenses for liquor stores located within 500 feet of the church. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982). because every accommodation, qua accommodation, has a religious purpose and a primary effect that advances religion." Such a mechanical application of Lemon, however, disregards the protected status that the free exercise clause bestows on religious exercise. 7 In this interpretation of the Lemon requirements, the free exercise clause itself lacks a secular purpose and has the primary effect of advancing religion. 75 Therefore, to determine whether an accommodation violates the establishment clause it is necessary to focus on the means through which a particular accommodation is effected rather than on the accommodation per se. 76 
B. Assessing the Permissibility of a Particular Accommodation of Religion: Lemon Reconsidered
The Lemon test has attracted sharp criticism both inside 77 and outside 7 8 the Court. The criticisms focus mainly on the ad hoc results to which the test gives rise 7 9 and on the test's tendency to obscure the privileged status that the religion clauses accord religious liberty. 80 Despite these criticisms, Justice O'Connor, who is committed to the continued viability of Lemon, has revised the first two prongs to proscribe legislation having the purpose or primary effect of endorsing religion. 81 Justice O'Connor's insight suggests a reformulation of the Lemon standard to provide an approach to determining the permissibility of governmental accommodations of religion under the establishment clause. Insofar as this approach builds on the concerns at the core of nonestablishment doctrine and recognizes the role 73. "By definition, such legislation has a religious purpose and effect in promoting the free exercise of religion." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 82 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
74. 79. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 108 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (secular purpose prong "mercurial in application"); Schwartz, supra note 78, at 193 & n.89 ( "Absolute certainty in constitutional interpretation is neither possible nor particularly desirable. When, however, the Court uses a test that requires it to divine legislative motives, to discern a program's 'primary' effect, and to calculate whether that program would create 'excessive' entanglement, its decisions inevitably result in absolute uncertainty regarding the meaning of the Constitution.").
80. 
Assessing the Purpose of an Accommodation
As argued above, invalidating an accommodation of religion because its purpose is manifestly non-secular overlooks the accommodation's importance in furthering free exercise. Rather than attempting to ascribe a secular purpose to the legislation at issue, 8 " the inquiry under the purpose prong should focus on whether the legislation is designed to remove governmentally imposed burdens on religious exercise. Identification of a religious belief or practice that, absent the accommodative legislation at issue, is at risk of being indirectly burdened by other governmental action should normally be sufficient to legitimate the purpose of the challenged legislation. Should the history of the legislation indicate that, despite its purported purpose, its central function is to endorse religion, the legislation should be struck down. 84 In Wallace v. Jaffree, 85 for example, Justice O'Connor considered whether the statute at issue, which provided for a moment of silence in school to be used for meditation or prayer, could be characterized as an accommodation rather than as an endorsement of religion. 8 " Observing that there was no religious practice at risk of being burdened through government action because Alabama law already called for a moment of silence, 87 she concluded that the statute's purpose was to endorse religion 83. The attempt to devise a secular purpose for an accommodation of religion may obscure its role in removing governmentally imposed burdens on religious exercise, and, consequently, may confuse the inquiry concerning its permissibility under the establishment clause. This inquiry should focus directly on the accommodation's success in removing such burdens. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("disingenuous to look for a purely secular purpose" of an accommodation; religious purpose is "legitimated by the Free Exercise Clause").
84. The permissible purpose requirement would be satisfied with respect to such statutes upon a showing that, absent statutory protection, some religious belief or practice would be burdened by governmental action.
Assessing the Primary Effect of an Accommodation
The voluntary nature of religious exercise is imperiled when government confers its official imprimatur on religion, 90 when tax revenues are used to support religious activities, 91 or when government requires the affirmance or disaffirmance of religious beliefs. 2 The neutral primary effect requirement provides that an accommodation may not mandate the profession of religious beliefs, endorse religion, or provide direct financial support to religion. It ensures that the effects of an accommodation not extend beyond the purpose of removing governmentally imposed burdens. Although the Court never explicitly embraced the position in the "aid to parochial school" cases that the issue of primary effect involved endorsement and financial support, the factors that it considered salient to its inquiry under the primary effect prong reveal these related concerns. Aid that clearly extended the benefits of public welfare to private individuals and was tailored to facilitate their choices was less suspect than direct financial aid to religious schools, which had the appearance of endorsing the religious mission of the schools by putting governmental funds collected from individual taxpayers at the schools' disposal. Compare Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) The Yale Law Journal Vol. 96: 1147, 1987
a. Endorsement
Determining whether an accommodation impermissibly endorses religion requires "judicial interpretation of social facts." ' 94 Thus, it involves an informed assessment of the historical context giving rise to the accommodation.
9 5 Legislation written in religiously neutral terms 9 6 and tailored to enhance the choices of private individuals avoids the appearance of endorsement. 97 An accommodation should convey the message that it is treating religious adherents differently only in order to remove governmentally imposed burdens. at 711-12 (objective observer would perceive Title VII's reasonable accommodation requirement as antidiscrimination law rather than as endorsement of religion or of particular religious practices, in part because requirement extends to all beliefs and practices).
However, legislation referring to a specific religion does not necessarily endorse that religion impermissibly. The historical context and the implementation of the legislation may militate against the appearance of endorsement. See, e.g., The Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1902(b) (1982) (exempting slaughter "in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith or any other religious faith that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the animal suffers [instantaneous] loss of consciousness").
97. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. at 399 ("[w]here, as here, aid to parochial schools is available only as a result of decisions of individual parents, no 'imprimatur of state approval' . . . can be deemed to have been conferred on any particular religion, or on religion generally." (citation omitted)).
spective of whether government is placing its imprimatur on religion, government may not finance religious exercise. 98 In determining the validity of financial support, 9 " the Court has drawn a line between programs that subsidize religious operations and programs that, by funding the secular activities of a religious institution, effectively permit the institution to devote greater resources to its religious activities. 100 Government's legitimate interest in the secular activities of religiously affiliated institutions is sufficient to justify government funding of those activities as long as the funded secular activities are separate from the institutions' religious activities 0 1 and the program does not impermissibly endorse religion 02 nor impose religious beliefs. 1 0 3 Consequently, accommodations of religion may not involve government subsidies to religious institutions unless such subsidies are in furtherance of legitimate governmental interests other than the interest in accommodation. 1 672, 679 (1971) . Tilton involved federal construction grants to church-affiliated colleges and universities for facilities devoted to secular functions. Invalidating the program on the ground that it freed institutional resources for the construction of buildings dedicated to religious worship would have required the assumption that the institutions involved would not have undertaken the construction of religious buildings without the financial aid to the secular construction program. This assumption, however, is questionable: Without the funding, the institutions' priorities might have led them, on the contrary, to build buildings devoted to religious activities while forsaking other secular construction.
101 
c. Imposed Affirmance of Religious Belief
Although the Court has not applied it in recent cases arising under the establisment clause, a fundamental nonestablishment principle is that government may not "force a person 'to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.'",5 In Torcaso v. Watkins, for example, the Court held that Maryland's constitutional provision conditioning public office on the profession of belief in God violated the appellant's freedom of belief and religion. 10 8 The state's exercise of force to compel affirmance of religious beliefs is a paradigmatic establishment of religion. Such compulsion has the obvious primary effect of advancing religion. 1 ""
Assessing Potential for Entanglement
The third component of the Lemon standard requires that government not become excessively entangled with religion. Application of this requirement to accommodations of religion presents no special problems. Exemptions do not risk excessive government entanglement with religion. 10 8 If accommodations involve affirmative government actions, government may not supervise religious institutions 0 9 or decide questions of religious practice or doctrine, which are beyond its competence.Y 1 Conversely, accommodations may not delegate to religion control over affairs properly within the sphere of government." 1 that, by subsidizing travel to church, sought to offset the effects of zoning ordinances that required adherents to live a distance from their churches would be impermissible, even if it were possible to draft such legislation to avoid the appearance of endorsement. 106. 367 U.S. at 496. 107. Because this requirement implicates individual freedom of belief, it can be characterized as deriving from the free exercise guarantee. In fact, the Court has invoked it regularly as a free exercise principle. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963). Nevertheless, insofar as the prohibition against governmental imposition of religious beliefs extends even to forcing a person to affirm religious beliefs with which he or she agrees, it captures a core nonestablishment principle.
108. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) (tax exemption "creates only a minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of churches"). The potential for governmental entanglement in the enforcement of a statutory exemption is no greater than the entanglement that attends courts' disposition of free exercise claims for exemptions. 
Marriage as a Free Exercise Right and the Burden Imposed by Civil Divorce
The right to marry is one of the cluster of fundamental freedoms concerning familial matters accorded constitutional stature by the Supreme Court." 1 2 Although courts have most frequently spoken of marriage as protected within a zone of privacy,"' 3 the right to marry can involve a religious dimension which ties it more closely to the Constitution's free exercise guarantee."" The centrality of marriage within different religious traditions is recognized by solemnization provisions in every state. Solemnization permits a couple to enter a legally binding relationship through a religious ceremony, in effect, granting civil legal status to a religious ceremony.' 1 5 In Judaism, marriage is central to religious life. 1143 (1979) (annulling marriage on basis of fraud affecting essentials of marriage). In Wolfe, the defendant deceived the plaintiff, a devout Catholic, into marrying her by telling him that her first husband had passed away. The court held that this fraud affected the essentials of the marriage and made the defendant unable to continue to perform marital duties and obligations. Wolfe reflects the court's view that religious commitment is often an essential aspect of a marriage.
116. The obligation to marry arises from the obligation to be fruitful and multiply. obligations that are fulfilled within the domestic sphere devolve upon the observant Jewish woman.
11 7 Because freedom to enter into a Jewish marriage is important to a Jewish woman's religious observance, it falls within the protection of the free exercise clause.
Prior to the enactment of the get statute, civil divorce indirectly burdened the right to marry within Judaism of women whose husbands obtained civil divorces without giving gets to their wives. Civil divorce did not condition a legal result on their nonadherence to Judaism, 1 1 8 but, like the legislation challenged in Braunfeld, it contributed to the cost of such adherence. 1 1 9 Civil divorce impeded some women's ability to marry within Judaism because their former husbands desired to change their civil marital status but were unwilling to procure Jewish divorces. The inability to remarry within Judaism can thus be described as an indirect effect 120 of civil divorce; the state's attempt to offset this effect constitutes an accommodation of religion.
121
Operation of the Statute
The get statute requires a party filing for divorce to remove all barriers within his or her power to the other party's marriage, as such barriers are 120. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49. The husband's refusal to grant a get is analogous to the competitive retail business in Braunfeld. Despite the get statute, husbands may still leave their wives without giving them gets, just as Sabbatarians might still have encountered ruinous competition from non-Sabbatarians, even if a Sabbatarian exception to the Sunday Closing Law had been enacted. The Sabbatarian exception would have neutralized whatever increased costs might be attributable to the Sunday Closing Law. Similarly, the get statute neutralizes whatever contributory role civil divorce has in the agunah problem. While this role, of course, cannot be measured, the availability of civil divorce may increase men's propensity to withhold a get because the procurement of a civil divorce lends a sufficient air of legitimacy to what would otherwise be desertion.
121. Some critics argue that the get statute attempts to solve a problem created by Jewish law, which only Jewish law is equipped to resolve. See, e.g., Kochen, supra note 16, at 1. This argument misconstrues the statute, which addresses the problem only to the extent that it may be exacerbated by the availability of civil divorce. Husbands who abandon their wives but do not seek a change in their civil marital status do not fall within the reach of the statute, even though their wives will not be able to remarry under Jewish law. marry within Judaism to which the availability of civil divorce contributes.
B. Endorsement
Although the get statute benefits observant Jewish women at risk of being civilly divorced without receiving a get, it does not suggest impermissible endorsement of religion or of the Jewish religion. The statute is written in religiously neutral terms and extends to "conscientious restraints or inhibitions." 12 5 It thus anticipates any situation where a party to a divorce may impede the remarriage of the other party.' 26 The scope of the statute, though, is limited to parties originally married in a religious ceremony.
1 27 The statute does not promote a particular type of religious marriage or divorce, or religious marriage and divorce generally, but merely conditions civil dissolution of a marriage on satisfaction of requirements that were implicit at its inception.
The inquiry regarding the statute's potential for endorsement, however, may not stop with the statute's text. A person acquainted with the statute's history" 2 8 would be aware that it was passed specifically to alleviate a problem arising in the interaction between Jewish and civil law.' 29 Consequently, it is necessary to consider whether, as applied to parties married within Judaism, the statute does not impermissibly endorse that religion. Insofar as the get statute requires a party married in a Jewish ceremony to appear before a rabbinic tribunal in order to receive a civil divorce, the statute might appear to endorse the Jewish religion. However, certain aspects of Jewish law militate against this view.
In Judaism, the legal dimensions of marriage are essentially contractual. 3 0 Marriage terminates either upon the death of one party or upon the presentation of a get."' By appearing before a rabbinic tribunal the husband is fulfilling an obligation he incurred upon entering a Jewish marriage.' 82 In requiring the "removal of barriers to remarriage" as de-fined in the religious tradition within which the marriage was enacted, the statute enforces this obligation. Similarly, in the commercial context, courts enforce arbitration agreements to appear before rabbinical tribunals and abide by their decisions."' The statute effectively remedies a religious bias that was masked in the formal neutrality of civil divorce prior to the get statute. The assumption that marriage is a status under the control of a court, rather than a contract between two parties, originates in a particular religious tradition." 4
C. Imposition of Religious Beliefs
Courts might be prohibited from requiring the removal of barriers to remarriage if such removal required the affirmance of a religious belief. The delivery of a get, however, involves neither professions of faith nor devotional acts. 3 5 The text of the get makes no reference to God by name. It merely states that the husband is releasing the wife from her marital obligations and freeing her to remarry. 13 ' Like a Jewish commercial contract, the exchange of a get is exclusively regulated by the "civil" aspect of Jewish law, which governs relationships between human beings. 366-67 (1904) . For a discussion of the earlier progression from marriage and divorce at the husband's will to marriage and divorce under ecclesiastical courts, see generally 1 & 2 G. HOWARD, 
supra.
135. See I. HAUT, supra note 1, at 31-41 (describing get procedure).
136. Id. at 17-18. 137. See I. KLEIN, supra note 1, at 382. In Minkin, the court held that enforcement of a marriage contract requiring the procurement of a get did not violate the establishment clause because exchange
D. Nonentanglement
The get statute's operation risks governmental entanglement with religion in two ways. First, the statute appears to require judges to decide the doctrinal question of whether the barriers to the remarriage of a party to divorce have been properly removed under Jewish law. 138 Second, by allowing the cleric who solemnized the original marriage to contest by affidavit a party's claim that barriers to the other party's remarriage have been removed, the statute appears to give a religious functionary discretion over a governmental function, the granting of a divorce.' 39 The statute, however, can be read narrowly to avoid these apparent entanglements.
Whether a get has been exchanged is not a complex doctrinal question; it is a factual matter, readily ascertainable within the Orthodox or Conservative tradition. A certificate signed by the rabbis who supervised the get demonstrates compliance with the technical requirements for the presentation of a get.' 40 The only doctrinal question that may arise is whether a get exchanged in the Conservative tradition is sufficient to constitute a valid get in the Orthodox tradition. To avoid resolving this problem, courts should interpret the statute narrowly, according to its terms, which require the removal of barriers to remarriage as such barriers are defined by the tradition within which the original marriage took place. 14 To decide this issue, the get statute requires that the court defer to the authority who is most competent to determine this fact: the cleric who solemnized the wedding. 42 In property disputes between church factions, courts are permitted under the establishment clause to defer to the highest authority within a hierarchical church on the issue of which faction legitimately represents the church. 43 In limiting the entry of an affidavit specifically to the cleric who originally solemnized the marriage, the statute functions like the rule providing for courts' deference to a religious authority in a property dispute. To avoid excessive entanglement with religion, courts may not permit anyone but the cleric who officiated at the original wedding to enter an affidavit regarding the removal of barriers to remarriage. Accommodations of Religion
The get statute removes governmentally imposed burdens on religious exercise and, consequently, promotes free exercise norms. Because it neither endorses nor requires the affirmance of religious beliefs, and it can be interpreted narrowly to avoid excessive government entanglement with religion, it should be upheld as a permissible accommodation of religion.
E. Potential Free Exercise Challenges
A husband originally married under Jewish law but subsequently converted to a different religion may claim that complying with the get statute violates his free exercise of religion. If the dictates of his religion conflict with the giving of a get then the statute directly burdens his religious exercise. In such circumstances his claim should be treated no differently from any other claim for an exemption under the free exercise clause. 145
V. CONCLUSION
A systematic resolution of the constitutional questions raised by the get statute will require the courts to apply the nonestablishment mandate to accommodations of religion. This Note proposes a standard to determine the permissibility of accommodations of religion to assist courts confronted with the constitutionality of legislation intended to remove burdens on religious exercise created by government action. Application of the standard to the get statute suggests its validity under the establishment clause.
The usefulness of the proposed approach extends beyond its application to the get statute. An analysis that focuses first on whether legislation removes governmentally imposed burdens on religious exercise should provide the basis for a unified approach to a broad range of establishment problems that might otherwise appear so diverse as to preclude common analysis. At base, the approach reflects the concern for religious liberty that is the core of the religion clauses.
away. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 253(7). This limitation may make the statute underinclusive; but it is preferable to encouraging courts to become entangled impermissibly with religion.
145. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
